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Abstract
We study the general equilibrium properties of two growth models with overlapping gener-
ations, habit formation and endogenous fertility. In the neoclassical model, habits modify the
economys growth rate and generate transitional dynamics in fertility; stationary income per
capita is associated with either increasing or decreasing population and output, depending on
the strength of habits. In the AK specication, growing population and increasing consump-
tion per capita require that the habit coe¢ cient lie within denite boundaries; outside the
critical interval, positive growth is associated with either declining consumption due to over-
crowding, or extinction paths with declining population. In both frameworks, habits reduce
fertility: the trade-o¤ between second-period consumption and spending for bequests prompts
agents to decrease fertility in order to make parental altruism less costly. This mechanism
suggests that status-dependent preferences may explain part of the decline in fertility rates
observed in most developed economies.
3
1 Introduction
One of the major stylized facts that characterized the development process of industrialized
economies is the decline in fertility rates. In developed countries, the transition from rapid
population growth to low net fertility rates began with the second phase of industrialization in
the nineteenth century. Birth rates declined faster than mortality rates, yielding a substantial
reduction in net population growth - a phenomenon labelled as the demographic transition.
After World War II, net fertility rates reached exceptionally low levels, and fell short of the
replacement threshold even in countries where fertility had traditionally been high - e.g.
Spain and Italy.1 In less developed countries, the fertility transition started in the mid-1960s,
and it was particularly rapid in East Asia.
In spite of institutional di¤erences, demographic transitions regularly characterized eco-
nomic development throughout the industrialized world. The study of the causal relations
behind the fertility decline attracted the attention of several economists, and the renewed
interest in formal growth theories inspired a new body of literature that analyzes endoge-
nous population dynamics. Various explanations for the demographic transition have been
advanced. First, declining fertility rates may be due to technological progress that - through
its impact on the demand for human capital - reverses the relationship between income and
population growth with respect to the regime of Malthusian stagnation (Galor and Weil,
2000). Second, increasing real wages raise the opportunity cost of having children, and lower
fertility generates positive feedback e¤ects on economic growth through capital accumulation
(Galor and Weil, 1996). Third, there may be trade-o¤s between the quality and quantity of
children in parentsdesires, that introduce a bias against quantity due to parentsaspirations
(Mulligan, 1997), the forces of natural selection (Galor and Moav, 2002), increased longevity
(Ehrlich and Liu, 1991), or interactions between education choices and unobservable skills of
children (Becker, 1991).2 Fourth, fertility decline may be associated with changing patterns in
intergenerational transfers - the so-called Caldwell hypothesis (Caldwell, 1982). At low levels
of economic development, the average family size is large as transfers ow from the young to
the old. In developed economies, family size is small as the net transfer ow is from parents
1Spain and Italy are nowadays among the countries with the lowest fertility rates in the world. The total
fertility rate fell from around 3 in 1960, to 1:2 in 2000, that is well below the replacement level of 2:1 (Kohler
et al. 2002).
2According to Becker (1991), parents wish to invest in their childrens education but cannot raise capital on
the security of their childrens unproven ability, so that more able parents prefer quality to quantity.
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to children. The idea that population dynamics are governed by the direction of transfers
has been formalized in a recent contribution by Blackburn and Cipriani (2005), who assume
that agents optimally choose the amount of transfers to both parents and children, and show
that two-sided altruism generates development paths that are consistent with the Caldwell
hypothesis.3
Empirical evidence and quantitative analyses suggest that each of these views has its mer-
its, though a monocausal explanation for (i) the low fertility rates currently observed in devel-
oped countries, and (ii) the demographic transition experienced by most Western economies,
is unlikely to hold (see Mateos-Planas, 2002; Doepke, 2005; Lagerlöf, 2006).4 The aim of this
paper is not to challenge previous explanations, but rather to investigate an additional mecha-
nism through which fertility choices might have been a¤ected by economic development. The
basic idea is that fertility choices interact with status-dependent preferences. In particular,
we argue that habit formation generates reallocation e¤ects that help explain the decline in
fertility rates.
Most if not all theoretical models of fertility assume that intertemporal choices are based on
standard time-separable preferences dened over absolute consumption levels. However, there
is now a large consensus on the fact that preferences are status- and time-dependent in reality.
A growing body of empirical evidence shows that economic agents form habits, and tend to
assess present satisfaction on the basis of deviations from the standards of living enjoyed in
the past (Osborn, 1988; Fuhrer and Klein, 1998; Fuhrer, 2000; Guariglia and Rossi, 2002). At
the theoretical level, a recent strand of literature investigates the e¤ects of habits on economic
growth in general equilibrium models. In this framework, habit formation - also labelled
as internal habits, or inwardlooking preferences - a¤ects capital accumulation because
agents make their savings decisions by comparing current consumption with a psychological
benchmark, represented by a weighted average of own past consumption levels (Caroll et
al. 1997; Alvarez-Cuadrado et al. 2004). Quantitative applications suggest that status-
dependent preferences may explain various stylized facts - e.g. the hump-shaped time paths
3Similarly to Blackburn and Cipriani (2005), intergenerational transfers will play an important role in our
results, though there are important di¤erences in the aim of our analysis and the assumptions of the model.
See section 5 on this point.
4For example, the idea that fertility declined in response to a reduction in infant mortality may be consistent
with observed dynamics in Germany and Sweden. However, in the United States and France, reduced mortality
followed fertility decline (Galor, 2005), suggesting that the contribution of observed mortality rates to the
demographic transition is limited in these cases (Mateos-Planas, 2002).
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that characterized the behavior of saving rates in Japan (Caroll, 2000) and Western Europe
in the post-war period (Alvarez-Cuadrado, 2008).
Recent contributions relax the traditional assumption of innitely-lived agents, and analyze
the consequences of benchmark preferences in overlapping generations models where consumers
optimize over nite horizons. Abel (2005) studies the e¤ects of habits and social status on the
allocation of consumption across generations when agents are selsh. Alonso-Carrera et al.
(2007) extend the model of dynastic altruism of de la Croix and Michel (1999) to include habit
formation, and show that habits reduce the willingness of individuals to leave bequests under
exogenous population growth. This result hinges on a general mechanism of reallocation in
life-cycle resources that will be relevant to our conclusions. In particular, we will formalize
the idea that persistently low fertility rates can be induced by status-dependent preferences
because agents internalize previous standards of living into their saving motives and fertility
choices. This reasoning may be linked to the observation that low-reproduction strategies -
i.e. intentional choices aimed at preserving the family property and status - ceased to be an
exclusive feature of the aristocracy already in the 19th century, as the same behavior gradually
spread across the bourgeoisie, land-owners, and other social classes (Johansson, 1987; Haines,
1992).
At the formal level, our analysis may be interpreted as an extended dynastic model with
altruistic agents that includes both habit formation and endogenous fertility. In Section 2,
we study consumption and fertility choices in an overlapping generations economy, where
the number of children provides utility in the rst period of life, while second-period utility
depends on the gap between current and previous consumption levels. Agents are altruistic
towards their descendants, and the opportunity cost of fertility is determined by the amount
of bequests that parents give to their children. However, due to habit formation, consumption
choices are biased in favor of second-period consumption, and agents tend to reduce the share
of resources devoted to bequests. The consequence of this consumption-bias is a reduction in
fertility rates: being able to choose the number of children, agents reduce fertility in order to
make parental altruism less costly. We investigate the implications for economic growth and
population dynamics under two technology specications that are standard in growth theory.
Section 3 considers an AK model where the growth rate of aggregate output is independent of
habits. In this framework, growing population and increasing consumption per capita require
that the habit coe¢ cient lie within denite boundaries. Outside the critical interval, positive
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growth is associated with either declining consumption due to overcrowding, or extinction
paths with declining population. Section 4 assumes a neoclassical technology with constant
returns to scale. Di¤erently from the Ramsey model with habit formation and exogenous
population growth (Ryder and Heal, 1973), habits modify the economys growth rate. While
the long-run equilibrium features constant output per capita, the growth rate of aggregate
output is determined by the equilibrium rate of population growth - which is endogenous,
and modied by habit formation. In the long run, stationary income per capita is associated
with either increasing or decreasing population and output, depending on the strength of
habits. We also simulate the transitional dynamics, showing that a declining transitional path
in fertility rates arises, and is exclusively due to habit formation. Section 5 discusses the
connections between our results and previous literature, and Section 6 concludes.
2 Consumption and fertility choices
In each period, indexed by t, total population Nt consists of Not old agents and N
y
t young
agents. Young agents supply one unit of work time to rms and save, whereas old agents
only earn capital income as a result of previous savings. At the end of period t, each young
agent generates nt children that will become productive workers in the subsequent period:
Nyt+1 = N
y
t nt. Total population at time t + 1 thus equals Nt+1 = N
y
t (1 + nt), and the gross
rate of population growth is dened as
Nt+1
Nt
= nt 1

1 + nt
1 + nt 1

: (1)
As regards individual budget constraints, we allow for the presence of intergenerational trans-
fers in the form of inter-vivos gifts, denoted by bt  0 and dened in the father-to-son direction:
if bequest motives are operative, each young agent in period t receives bt units of output and, in
turn, will transfer bt+1nt units of output to his successors. The individual budget constraints
thus read
ct = wt + bt   st; (2)
et+1 = rt+1st   bt+1nt; (3)
where c is consumption when young, e is consumption when old, w is the wage rate, and r
is gross interest on previous savings received during retirement. In general, positive transfers
(bt > 0) will arise whenever the degree of dynastic altruism is su¢ ciently strong to make
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the bequest motive operative (Thibault, 2000) - a circumstance that can be addressed after
deriving the temporary equilibrium of the economy.5 If bequests are operative in the equilib-
rium, we have bt > 0, and the resulting equilibrium path exhibits many basic properties of
Ramsey-type equilibria in models with innitely-lived representative agent, such as dynamic
e¢ ciency and policy neutrality; if bequests are not operative in the equilibrium (bt = 0), ex-
pressions (2)-(3) reduce to the standard budget constraints of OLG models with selsh agents
à la Diamond (1965).6 In this regard, our strategy will be to study the characteristics of
the equilibrium with strictly positive bequests, and derive ex-post existence conditions for an
optimal path with positive bequests (see condition (28) below).
Private welfare for each agent alive in (t; t+ 1) equals
Wt = U (ct; et+1; nt) + Wt+1;
where U (ct; et+1; nt) represents direct utility provided by consumption levels and the number
of children, and  2 (0; 1) is the altruism factor, i.e. the weight put by each agent on the
welfare of each of the successors.7 Imposing the limiting condition limj!1 j tWj = 0, the
dynastic utility function can be written as
W0 =
1X
j=0
jU (cj ; ej+1; nj) : (4)
5The operativeness of bequests is generally linked to technological and preference parameters according to
the following logic. Since making a positive transfer to successors implies reduced capital accumulation, agents
nd it optimal only if the resulting increase in utility through the altruistic term more than compensates for the
loss in second-period capital income. Hence, bequests are operative in the equilibrium if the degree of altruism
(denoted by  in the present paper) is su¢ ciently high relative to the technological parameters determining
capital protability: see e.g. the condition derived in de la Croix and Michel (2002: p.253).
6Thibault (2000) shows that, under specications (2)-(3), the equilibrium with operative bequests: (i) exists
only if the conditions for dynamic e¢ ciency are satised; and (ii) is unique. Moreover, Thibault (2000) shows
that (iii) the equilibrium with zero bequests coincides with the Diamond (1965) equilibrium - so it can be
dynamically ine¢ cient. de la Croix and Michel (2002: sect. 5.1.4) discuss the conditions under which the
equilibrium with operative bequests coincides with the modied golden rule à la Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans and
implies policy neutrality (Ricardian Equivalence). In our analysis of the neoclassical model, we specify numerical
parameters that allow the economy to be dynamically e¢ cient in the long run: see section 4.2.
7 In this specication, the utility of each agent is a¤ected by the utility of each child with a xed degree
of altruism, . As the budget constraint is expressed in terms of per-child bequest, the interpretation is that
individual choices regarding the amount of per-child gifts, bt+1, are determined on the basis of per-child utility,
Wt+1. An equivalent interpretation is that parents care about the average utility of each child, as explained in
Doepke and Zilibotti (2005).
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Expression (4) is the typical objective function encountered in dynastic models, where the
degree of altruism, , is analogous to a discount factor imposed at time zero over future
generations direct utilities. As shown e.g. by de la Croix and Michel (2002: Ch.5), the
assumption of perfect foresight allows us to re-interpret the sequence of individual optimization
problems as a single innite-horizon problem. In order to analyze the interactions between
habit formation and fertility choices, direct utility will be specied as
U (ct; et+1; nt) = u (nt) + u (ct) + v (et+1; ct) ; (5)
uc > 0; ucc  0; un > 0; unn  0;
ve > 0; vee  0; and vc < 0:
The rst element in (5) is a well-behaved utility function u (nt) where the fertility rate appears
as a normal good. Having children provides personal satisfaction, and fertility rates are chosen
in order to maximize private benets. The way in which we model fertility choices is thus
standard in terms of preferences, but the cost of raising children is specically linked to our
assumption of dynastic altruism. A ceteris paribus increase in the number of children implies
an increased cost in terms of second-period gifts. Each agent will thus balance higher direct
utility with reduced consumption possibilities in the second period of life, in compliance with
the present-value budget constraint
bt+1nt = rt+1

wt + bt  
 
ct + et+1r
 1
t+1

: (6)
As regards consumption preferences in (5), u (ct) is direct utility from rst-period consumption,
 > 0 is the individual time-preference factor, and v (et+1; ct) embodies the second crucial
assumption of our model, i.e. habit formation. More precisely, v (et+1; ct) represents second-
period utility from relative consumption: for a given benchmark level enjoyed when young,
ct, utility from consumption when old increases with direct consumption (ve > 0, vee  0)
but is lower the higher is rst-period consumption (vc < 0). In this regard we will follow the
standard specication of subtractive habits - see (15) below.
Under the assumption of perfect foresight, the solution to the dynastic problem can be
found by maximizing (4) subject to (6), using the sequences of consumption levels and fertility
rates as control variables. The associated Lagrangean at time t is
Lt = U (ct; et+1; nt) + t+1 rt+1
nt

wt + bt  

ct +
et+1
rt+1

  tbt; (7)
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where  represents the dynamic multiplier attached to the individual budget constraint. The
optimality conditions of the consumers problem read
Lct = 0 ! (uct + vct)nt = t+1rt+1; (8)
Lnt = 0 ! untn2t = t+1rt+1

wt + bt  
 
ct + et+1r
 1
t+1

; (9)
Let+1 = 0 ! vet+1nt = t+1; (10)
Lbt = 0 ! t+1rt+1 = tnt: (11)
The crucial conditions linking consumption and fertility choices are thus summarized by
t = uct + vct = vet+1rt+1; (12)
unt = tbt+1r
 1
t+1: (13)
Expression (12) is the Euler condition for consumption allocation, a¤ected by the presence
of habits (vct > 0). Expression (13) characterizes optimal fertility choices, and asserts that
the marginal cost of bequests - discounted by the prevailing interest rate - must equal the
marginal benet from having children, un. Notice that, in order to interpret bt as bequest,
we should impose a non-negativity constraint bt  0 in each period. For the sake of clarity,
we will concentrate on the characteristics of interior solutions without specifying further con-
straints ex-ante. Since the main results are derived while assuming specic functional forms,
the non-negativity of bequests will be addressed by checking, ex-post, under what conditions
parameters are compatible with positive gifts along the optimal path.8 Let us assume the
following specications:
u (ct) = log ct; (14)
v (et+1; ct) = log (et+1   "ct) ; " > 0; (15)
u (nt) = n

t ; 0 <  < 1; (16)
where  > 0 is a weighting parameter for fertility preferences. Expression (15) species habit
formation according to the subtractive form(Alonso-Carrera et al. 2007), which postulates
a precise willingness to overcome previous consumption levels: the higher is " the stronger
8We choose this strategy because the aim of the present analysis is not to study the operativeness of bequest
motives, but rather the interactions between habit formation and fertility rates in situations where bequests
are operative. Operativeness is studied in detail in de la Croix and Michel (1999; 2002) and Alonso-Carrera et
al. (2007) in related models with exogenous population growth.
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is the role of habits in second-period consumption choices. Expression (16) assumes positive
but decreasing marginal utility from the number of children.9 As shown in the following
sections, assumptions (14)-(16) allow us to obtain closed-form solutions in the presence of
linear returns to aggregate capital, and ensure analytical tractability while studying long-run
equilibria under neoclassical technologies. We will later argue (Section 4.2) that logarithmic
additivity in U (ct; et+1; nt) may increase the generality of our results by ruling out ad-hoc
complementarities between consumption and fertility in individual preferences.
From (14)-(16), the optimality condition (12) implies the modied Euler equation
et+1 = ct [rt+1 + " (1 + )] ; (17)
according to which, for a given interest rate, the ratio between second- and rst-period con-
sumption is higher the stronger is the degree of habit formation. As may be construed, the bias
in favor of second-period consumption generates reallocation e¤ects that modify optimal fer-
tility choices. Studying these interactions, and their consequences for economic development,
is the central aim of our analysis.
Since technological specications matter for the nature of the results, we will consider two
central paradigms in growth theory, i.e. neoclassical technologies with constant returns to
scale versus constant marginal returns to aggregate capital. For the sake of exposition, we
begin by considering a simple AK model of endogenous growth.
3 Habits, Fertility and Endogenous Growth
This section analyzes the competitive equilibrium of a decentralized economy under laissez-
faire. Consumption and saving choices are characterized by the optimality conditions described
in Section 2, while the production sector is represented by prot-maximizing rms. In order
to analyze situations with linear returns to aggregate capital, we consider Romers (1989)
specication of learning-by-doing. There exist J identical rms, indexed by j, producing ~y(j)
units of nal good by employing ~k(j) units of capital and `(j) units of labor. Each rms
technology is represented by
~y(j) = (~k(j))

 
h(j)`(j)
1  (18)
9 In related work, de la Croix and Michel (1999) analyze status-dependent preferences in order to study the
e¤ects of inherited tastes, which is a di¤erent phenomenon with respect to habit formation, and reects into
di¤erent specications of rst-period utility. See section 5 on this point.
11
where h(j) parametrizes workersability and is taken as given by every agent in the economy. In
the competitive equilibrium, factor prices thus equal marginal productivities dened at given
ability levels. Since rms are of identical size, they employ identical amounts of inputs and
produce the same output level, ~y(j) = ~y. Aggregate output Y = J ~y equals Y = KL1 , where
K = J~k is aggregate capital and L = hJ` = hNy is aggregate e¢ cient labor (recall that labor
is supplied by the young cohort only). The engine of growth is knowledge accumulation due to
learning-by-doing. Following Romer (1989), workersknowledge is a¤ected by an aggregated
externality: h is positively related to the capital stock per-worker, kt  Kt=Nyt , according to
the linear relation
ht = kt =  (Kt=N
y
t ) ;
where the constant  > 0 represents the intensity of learning-by-doing. Substituting this
relation in the aggregate production function, we obtain Yt = AKt, where the (gross) marginal
social return from capital, A  1 , is constant over time. The gross marginal private return
from capital equals the equilibrium interest factor
rt = A < A; (19)
which is constant over time. Since the equilibrium wage rate reads
wt = (1  ) (Yt=Nyt ) ; (20)
we can substitute (19) and Kt+1 = N
y
t st in (2)-(3) to obtain the aggregate resource constraint
of the economy,
Kt+1 = AKt   Ct   Et: (21)
where Ct  Nyt ct and Et = Not et represent aggregate consumption of young and old agents,
respectively. Exploiting (14)-(16), individual consumption and fertility choices imply the
following (all proofs are in the Appendix)
Lemma 1 In an interior solution, aggregate consumption of both cohorts grows at the same
constant rate
Ct+1=Ct = Et+1=Et = A (22)
in each period t = 0; :::;1, and the share consumed when old is higher the stronger is habit
formation:
Ct
Et
=
A
A + "+ "
: (23)
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Expression (23) embodies the reallocation e¤ect induced by habit formation. A higher "
corresponds to a stronger willingness to postpone consumption in order to overcome historical
standards of living, and results in higher shares of output consumed by old agents in each
period. Expression (22) is conceptually analogous to the Keynes-Ramsey rule, and suggests
that a typical balanced growth equilibrium arises in the economy, at least in terms of aggregate
variables. We use italics in order to stress that positive net growth in aggregate output is not
necessarily associated with a continuous rise in individual consumption: equilibrium fertility
rates generally di¤er from output growth rates, so that declining per capita incomes due to
excessive birth rates - or increasing per capita incomes induced by declining population - are
not remote possibilities. This point will be addressed immediately after the necessary proof
of knife-edge balanced growth:
Lemma 2 In an interior solution, the consumption-output share of the young equals
  Ct
Yt
=
(1  ) A
A ( + ) + " (1 + )
(24)
in each period, and the economy exhibits a balanced growth path with
Kt+1=Kt = Yt+1=Yt = A (25)
in each period t = 0; :::;1.
An important consequence of knife-edge balanced growth is that individual bequests grow
at the same rate as individual consumption. In particular, the e¤ect of habit formation is to
reduce equilibrium bequests relative to rst-period consumption. To see this formally, dene
zt  bt=ct, and rewrite the lifetime budget constraint (6) as (see Appendix)
zt+1 =
1

zt +
1


1  
 
  (A+ ") (1 + )
A

: (26)
Since  < 1, it follows from (26) that, if a steady-state zss > 0 exists, the bequest-consumption
ratio jumps at this stationary level at t = 0, and is constant thereafter. Imposing stationarity
in (26), we obtain
zss =
1
1  

(A+ ") (1 + )
A
  1  
 

: (27)
Expression (27) implies that bequests are operative (zss > 0) only if the term in square
brackets is positive. From (24), this requires
1  
(1  )  <
A+ "+  (A+ ")
A + "+  (A+ ")
: (28)
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Satisfying the above inequality is a necessary condition to have interior solutions to the dy-
nastic problem. We thus restrict our attention to combinations of parameters that satisfy
(28). Recalling that  depends on ", expression (27) implies that an increase in the strength
of habits would reduce equilibrium bequests relative to rst-period individual consumption:
in line with the results of Alonso-Carrera et al. (2007), we have10
@zss
@"
=

1
1  

1 + 
A

1  1
(1  ) 

< 0: (29)
We now have all the elements to analyze equilibrium fertility rates. The following Propositions
show that (i) the equilibrium fertility rate is negatively related to the strength of habits, and
that (ii) positive population growth is compatible with increasing per capita incomes only if
the degree of habit formation falls within a precise range of values.
Proposition 3 Along the equilibrium path, the equilibrium fertility rate is constant: popula-
tion grows at the equilibrium rate
nss =

zss
A
 (A+ ")
 1

; (30)
with @nss=@" < 0 (stronger habits reduce population growth).
Proposition 3 and expression (29) imply that habit formation has intergenerational impact
along two distinct dimensions: stronger habits (i) reduce the share of expenditures devoted
to bequests, and (ii) reduce population growth. These results have an intuitive interpreta-
tion. Habits induce a bias in intertemporal choices that produces a reallocation in favor of
second-period consumption. Given the trade-o¤ between consumption when old and resources
available for bequest, agents are made more egotisticalby stronger habits - in the sense that
they will reduce fertility rates in order to make parental altruism less costly.
A peculiar feature of this model is that habit formation does not modify the growth rate
of aggregate output, while it determines fertility rates. This implies that habits modify the
dynamics of individual incomes, leaving output growth una¤ected at the economy level. In
particular, positive growth in aggregate output is not necessarily associated with growing
population and increasing consumption per capita. As shown below, this situation arises only
if " lies within denite boundaries.
10Result (29) is in line with the ndings of Alonso-Carrera et al. (2007: section 3), who show that habits
make the operativeness of bequests more di¢ cult, and there is a critical level of the degree of habit formation
above which agents become selsh.
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Proposition 4 Assume that parameters are compatible with positive growth in aggregate out-
put and positive bequests (A > 1 and zss > 0). There generally exist a couple of critical
levels "0 and "00, with "0 < "00, such that " = "0 implies nss = A > 1, and " = "00 implies
nss = 1. As a consequence, we may have three cases:
i. (Extinction path) if " > "00 population declines and per capita incomes grow faster than
aggregate output;
ii. (Overcrowding) if " < "0 population grows faster than aggregate output, implying declining
per capita incomes;
iii. (Non-degenerate growth) if "0 < " < "00, aggregate output, per capita incomes, and popu-
lation increase over time.
Proposition 4 directly follows from @nss=@" < 0, and draws a clear-cut distinction between
the dynamics of aggregate versus per capita variables. In case (i), habits are very strong
and consumption per capita grows faster than aggregate output. The excessive willingness to
consume prompts agents to choose low fertility rates, associated with declining population,
nss < 1. In the opposite situation - case (ii) - habits are very weak and fertility rates are
too high to guarantee sustained consumption standards for future generations: the gross rate
of population growth exceeds A, and individual incomes decline over time. The bottom-
line is that positive growth in aggregate output is associated with a growing population and
increasing per capita incomes if and only if the coe¢ cient of habit formation falls within denite
boundaries - i.e. the case of non-degenerate growtharising when "0 < " < "00. Numerical
substitutions suggest that fertility rates are quite sensitive to the coe¢ cient of habit formation:
in the example reported in Figure 1, the values for " delimiting non-degenerate growth are
"0 = 3:24% and "00 = 4:89%. If the coe¢ cient of habit formation lies outside this interval,
overcrowding or extinction paths immediately arise.11
The above results are useful in clarifying the negative impact of habits on equilibrium
fertility rates. The knife-edge character of the balanced-growth path clearly hinges on the
11See Figure 1. For a baseline non-degenerate value of " = 4%, gross per-period rates of growth of aggregate
output, population and consumption per capita respectively equal Yt+1=Yt = 1:2, nss = 1:11, and ct+1=ct =
1:085. Setting " = 6% yields an extinction path with declining population and excessive consumption growth
(nss = 0:88 and ct+1=ct = 1:36). The mirror case is obtained with " = 2%, associated with overcrowding
(nss = 1:36 and ct+1=ct = 0:88).
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assumption of linear returns, and a xed interest rate makes the economys growth rate in-
dependent of population growth. Results change in the neoclassical model, where decreasing
marginal returns to capital imply that accumulation rates, and therefore economic growth,
are crucially determined by fertility rates. This implies that habit formation modies the
economys growth rate both in the short and in the long run, as shown below.
4 Habits, Fertility and Neoclassical Growth
The neoclassical specication is easily obtained by ruling out learning-by-doing from the pre-
vious model. Assuming that h is a xed constant in rmstechnologies (18), we can dene
a constant proportionality factor H = h1  and rewrite aggregate output according to the
standard Cobb-Douglas form
Yt = HK

t (N
y
t )
1 
; (31)
where K now exhibits decreasing marginal returns. In terms of capital per-worker, kt 
Kt=N
y
t , the intensive-form technology reads yt = f (kt) = Hk

t , and equilibrium rates of
reward equal
rt = f
0 (kt) = Hk
 1
t and wt = (1  ) f (kt) : (32)
The aggregate constraint of the economy and the rst order conditions imply the following
dynamic relations:
ntkt+1 = f (kt)  ct   (et=nt 1) ; (33)
et+1 = ct

f 0 (kt+1) + " (1 + )

; (34)
tnt = t+1f
0 (kt+1) ; (35)
nt+1 =
1

nt +
1

[(1  ) f (kt+1)t+1   (1 + )] ; (36)
tct = f
0 (kt+1)

f 0 (kt+1) + "
 1
: (37)
Expression (33) is the aggregate constraint of the economy in terms of capital per-worker;
equations (34)-(35) are the optimality conditions (17) and (11); expressions (36)-(37) are
derived in the Appendix and characterize the joint dynamics of shadow prices and fertility
rates along the optimal path. We begin our analysis by studying the characteristics of the
steady-state equilibrium. Subsequently, we validate the usual interpretation of the steady-state
equilibrium as the long-run equilibrium of the economy by means of a numerical simulation
that analyzes transitional dynamics (Section 4.2).
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4.1 Steady-state analysis
Imposing steady-state conditions in system (33)-(37), and denoting by subscript stationary
values, we obtain
nk = f (k)  c   (e=n) ; (38)
e = c

f 0 (k) + " (1 + )

; (39)
f 0 (k) = n=; (40)
n =
1

n +
1

[(1  ) f (k)   (1 + )] ; (41)
c = f 0 (k)

f 0 (k) + "
 1
: (42)
which is a system of ve equations in ve unknowns (n; k; c; e; ). As shown in the
Appendix, the equilibrium condition determining the stationary fertility rate can be written
as
ga (n) = gb (n) ; (43)
where
ga (n) = n ; (44)
gb (n) =
 (1 + )
 (1  )  
(1  )
 (1  ) (1  )

n ( + ) + " (1 + )
n + "

: (45)
The equilibrium can be characterized by studying the properties of (44) and (45). We will label
as well-denedthe equilibria associated with n > 0, and as feasibleonly those implying
n > . The reason for the latter restriction is that, from (40), a candidate equilibrium with
n <  would imply f 0 (k) < 1 - that is, negative net rents from capital. It is instructive to
begin with the case of non-existent habits.
Proposition 5 If habits are inactive, " = 0, the steady-state equilibrium is unique.
Proposition 5 is described in Figure 2, which represents the equilibrium condition (43) in
the gi   n plane. When " = 0, function gb (n) reduces to a horizontal straight line. Since
ga (n) is strictly increasing and ga (0) = 0, there can be only one intersection, associated with
condition (43). The resulting equilibrium is well-dened and feasible provided that parameters
are such that n >  (see Appendix).
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Introducing habit formation, " > 0, function gb (n) becomes increasing and concave: from
(45), we have
@gb (n)
@n
=
" (1  )
 (1  ) (n + ")2
> 0;
@2gb (n)
@n2
=   2" (1  )
 (1  ) (n + ")3
< 0:
In this case, the equilibrium can be characterized as follows. Two important properties of
gb (n) are that
@gb (n)
@"
=   n (1  )
 (1  ) (n + ")2
< 0; (46)
lim
n!1
gb (n)

">0
= lim
"!0
gb (n) : (47)
Expression (46) implies that a ceteris paribus increase in " moves gb (n) south-west in the
gi   n plane. Expression (47) follows from (45), and asserts that gb (n) is asymptotically
horizontal and bounded from above by the value associated with inactive habits, lim"!0 gb (n).
These results imply that, starting from the case of inactive habits, subsequent increases in "
generate downward shifts in the gb (n) function for any positive fertility rate. Since ga (n)
is increasing and independent of habits, all intersections satisfying the equilibrium condition
ga = gb will necessarily be associated with lower fertility rates with respect to the case " = 0.
This result is described in the left graphs of Figure 2, where the highest equilibrium fertility
rate is the habit-free value, denoted as nmax.
As both ga (n) and gb (n) are concave, we may have either one or multiple intersec-
tions satisfying (43), depending on the constellation of parameters. However, the existence of
multiple intersections does not imply multiple equilibria, as shown in the following
Proposition 6 For any " < 1, there may exist only one feasible steady state. This equilibrium
is characterized by an intersection in which gb (n) cuts ga (n) from above.
The intuition behind Proposition 6 is described in graphical terms in Figure 2. As shown in
the Appendix, we may have two cases. When  > (1 + ) 1, we may only have one intersection
ga = gb, and this equilibrium is characterized by gb (n) cutting ga (n) from above. This case
is reported in Figure 2, Diagram (a). When  < (1 + ) 1, the vertical intercept of gb (n)
is negative, and condition ga = gb can be satised by two intersections denoted by n0 and
n00, with n0 < n00. This situation arises in Figure 2, Diagram (b), with " = 0:15. The high
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intersection n00 has the same properties as the unique equilibrium arising in Diagram (a). The
lowintersection n0, instead, satises the condition ga = gb with gb (n) cutting ga (n) from
below. However, the low intersection cannot be a feasible equilibrium because the feasibility
condition n0 >  is necessarily violated (see Appendix). As a consequence, a feasible steady
state is exclusively characterized by an intersection in which gb (n) cuts ga (n) from above:
this is the only possible equilibrium in case (a), and the only feasible equilibrium, n00, in case
(b) of Figure 2.12
This characterization of feasible equilibria has three main implications. First, a ceteris
paribus increase in the strength of habits reduces the optimal fertility rate in any feasible
steady state. As shown in the left graphs of Figure 2, gb shifts downward following an increase
in ", and the equilibrium fertility rate consequently shrinks.
Second, whenever a feasible equilibrium exists without habits, there is always a range of
positive values of " for which feasible equilibria also exist with habit formation. In fact, if
nmax > , it is always possible to dene a critical value of habit formation " > 0 such that
" = " implies an equilibrium with n = . This critical level can be calculated by imposing
n =  in condition (43) to obtain
" =
(1  )[(1 + )  (1  )]  (1  )( + )
(1  )[(1  )  (1 + )] + (1 + )(1  ) : (48)
Given Proposition 5 and result (46), any value of " exceeding " would generate equilibria
that violate feasibility (n < ), whereas any degree of habit formation falling within the
interval " 2  0; " yields feasible steady-state equilibria. This is the range of values of " that
is relevant for studying the long-run behavior of the system. In graphical terms, the relevant
regionis represented by the grey-shaded areas in the right graphs of Figure 2.
Third, if parameters allow for positive population growth when habits are inactive, there
always exists a critical degree of habit formation associated with constant population, and a
subset of feasible equilibria where population declines due to the presence of habits:
Lemma 7 Provided that nmax > 1, there exists a critical value " < " such that " = " implies
n = 1. Hence, the set of feasible equilibria with " > 0 includes two subsets of equilibria
respectively associated with n > 1 and n < 1.
12The existence of a second steady-state that is a candidate for the equilibrium is in line with the results
of Carrol et al. (1997), who show that despite the possible presence of a second steady-state, one of the two
cannot be optimal, implying that the long-run equilibrium is unique. The same result holds in the present
model, as shown below.
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The intuition behind Lemma 7 is that, since  < 1, the special case of constant population
n = 1 >  lies in the interior of the relevant region - see Figure 2. The consequence is that
di¤erent degrees of habit persistence determine whether long-run population growth rates
will be positive or negative. On the one hand, this result looks similar to that found in the
AK model: strong habit persistence may imply declining population. On the other hand, the
assumption of decreasing returns to capital yields quite di¤erent implications for the economys
growth rate. In the stationary equilibrium of the neoclassical model, consumption and capital
per worker are constant, and aggregate output grows at the same rate as population. Formally,
since f 0 (k) = Hk
 1
 , condition (40) reads
k =

H
n
 1
1 
; (49)
and implies that Kt+1=Kt = Nt+1=Nt = Yt+1=Yt = n in this equilibrium. Hence, habit
formation modies the economys growth rate through the fertility rate. This is an important
di¤erence with respect to previous literature on habit formation (see Section 5), and also with
respect to the AK model of Section 3. The characteristics of the neoclassical equilibrium are
summarized in the following
Proposition 8 Provided that nmax > 1, we may have three cases: (i) if 0 < " < ", the steady-
state equilibrium features increasing output and population; (ii) if " < " < ", the steady-state
equilibrium features declining output and population; (iii) if " = ", the steady-state equilibrium
features constant output and population.
Proposition 8 can be interpreted as follows. Households internalize the e¤ect of habits
in their bequest and saving motives, reducing fertility in order to make parental altruism
less costly. However, in a neoclassical world, fertility determines the economys growth rate,
which remains strictly positive if and only if habits are relatively weak, " < ". Excessive habit
formation, " > ", induces long-run equilibria where constant per capita incomes are associated
with falling population and declining aggregate output.
4.2 Equilibrium Dynamics
The previous Section postulates the usual interpretation of the steady-state equilibrium as
the long-run equilibrium of the economy. Two questions that still have to be addressed relate
to the dynamic stability of the stationary equilibrium, and the e¤ects of habit formation on
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transitional dynamics. The starting point of the analysis is a three-by-three dynamic system
that is obtained from suitable substitutions in (33)-(37). As shown in the Appendix, the
dynamic behavior of the economy is fully determined by three equations involving the crucial
variables k, , and n.
kt+1 =
1
nt

f(kt)  f
0(kt+1)
t(f 0(kt+1) + ")
  f
0(kt+1) + "(1 + )
t(f 0(kt+1) + ")

; (50)
t+1 =
tnt
f 0(kt+1)
; (51)
nt+1 =

1

nt +
1

[(1  ) f (kt+1)t+1   (1 + )]
1=
: (52)
From (50)-(52), the evolution of capital per capita depends on the expected interest rate, and
the dynamics of kt+1 are implicitly determined by equation (50) for a given set of parameters
f;H; ; ; ; ; "g.13 As before, it is instructive to begin with the case of inactive habits. In
this case, it is possible to show analytically that " = 0 implies no transition in fertility rates.
Proposition 9 When habits are inactive, the fertility rate is constant at each point in time
along the optimal path.
The intuition behind Proposition 9 is provided by the equilibrium condition for consump-
tion allocation (see Appendix),
Ct
Et
=
 (rt + ") rt+1
(rt+1 + ") [rt + " (1 + )]
: (53)
Expression (53) shows that the shares of output going to young and old agents are generally
time-varying, as they depend on capital accumulation. Setting " = 0, however, expression
(53) reduces to Ct=Et = =. Proposition 9 can thus be interpreted as follows: in the presence
of habits, the allocation of output among cohorts varies over time because individual choices
adjust to changing standards of living during the development process. Since the number of
children is determined by utility maximization, this mechanism characterizes both consump-
tion and fertility choices. Without habits, output allocation is time-invariant as no adjustment
in consumption, nor in fertility rates, is called for by changing standards of living.
13 The existence of habits (" > 0) makes the dynamics of capital per worker dependent on the expected interest
rate, as the presence of f 0 (kt+1) in the right-hand-side of (50) elucidates. Hence, kt+1 is (only) implicitly given
by (50). In the absence of habits (" = 0), equation (50) reduces to the familiar resource constraint
kt+1 =
1
nt

f(kt)  1
t

1 +



;
where kt+1 does not appear anymore in the right-hand-side.
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In general, the presence of habits yields transitional variations in fertility rates. Given the
complexity of the dynamic system (33)-(37), this issue can only be addressed numerically. As
a rst step, we have considered several di¤erent constellations of parameters, and derived the
respective eigenvalues from the Jacobian matrix. In this regard, numerical results show that
the model exhibits saddle-point stability for a wide range of parameter values, with one stable
and two unstable eigenvalues. As a second step, we perform a numerical simulation of the
full dynamics of the economy along the optimal path, with a special focus on the transitional
impact of habits on fertility decisions. In order to circumvent the disadvantages of methods
based on linearization, we use backward iteration to characterize approximate solutions to
the Euler equations (Strulik and Brunner, 2002; Heer and Maussner, 2005; see Appendix for
details). As noted above (footnote 13), the dynamics of kt+1 are implicitly determined by
equation (50) for a given set of parameters f;H; ; ; ; ; "g, and determine the respective
entries in the Jacobian matrix of the system by applying the implicit-function theorem. As a
benchmark-case, we specify the set of parameters as
 = 0:36, H = 10,  = 0:12,  = 0:5,  = 0:935,  = 0:93, " = 0:015;
which implies, in light of (38)-(42), the steady-state values
c = 6:24008, e = 6:84885, n = 1:06281, b = 0:42048, k = 6:0066,  = 0:15817:
The Jacobian evaluated at the steady-state, J, is equal to
J =

@kt+1
@kt
j @kt+1@t j
@kt+1
@nt
j
@t+1
@kt
j @t+1@t j
@t+1
@nt
j
@nt+1
@kt
j @nt+1@t j
@nt+1
@nt
j
 =

1:075268818 76:06568876  5:697822964
0:018122124 2:281978849 0:0528000960
11:87479223 1259:405296 0:5652977844
 ;
and the associated eigenvalues read
 =

2:39907513941288996
1:07526893420792736
0:44820137777951952
 :
With two unstable eigenvalues (1; 2 > 1) and one real stable eigenvalue (3 < 1), the
dynamic system (50)-(52) exhibits saddle-point stability with monotone convergence. The
results of the numerical exercises are presented in Figures 3 and 4.
We analyze the e¤ect of habits by considering three scenarios: (i) " = 0, represented by
the solid line; (ii) " = 1%, dashed line; and (iii) " = 1:5%, dotted line. Looking at Figure 3, it
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becomes apparent that habits do not play an important role in very early stages of economic
development. As the economy becomes richer, parents internalize the existence of habits in
their bequest and fertility choices, and the e¤ects of habit formation become relevant. Since
agents tend to allocate more resources in favor of second-period consumption, savings increase
with the strength of habits, thereby fuelling capital accumulation. In order to reduce the
private cost of having children, agents choose lower fertility rates for higher values of the
habit coe¢ cient. The bequest-consumption ratio, represented by zt = bt=ct, is declining over
time when habits are active, and the long-run value is inversely related to the degree of habit
persistence. This result conrms the intuition behind the reallocation e¤ects induced by habit
formation, and is in line with our previous conclusions in the AK model - see expression (29)
in Section 3.14
Figure 4 embodies two results. First, by virtue of the mechanism mentioned above, fertility
rates decline during the transition, i.e. net population growth rates are progressively reduced
by economic development. Second, the simulation conrms Proposition 9, by which fertility
rates are constant during the transition when " = 0. In other words, the demographic
transitiondepicted in Figure 4 is exclusively due to habit formation.
It should be stressed that the assumption of logarithmic preferences in consumption is
relevant for Proposition 9. If consumption preferences display an elasticity of intertemporal
substitution di¤erent from unity, the allocation of consumption over the life-cycle is a¤ected
by interest rates, independently of the presence of habits. In this case, consumption shares are
generally time-varying in the short run, and fertility rates likely exhibit transitional dynamics
even without habits. Hence, the transitional e¤ects of habits on fertility would interact with
those stemming from non-logarithmic preferences. However, our long-run results should re-
main valid even with other types of preferences. The reason is that the reallocation e¤ect -
i.e. the fact that habits reduce the share of resources devoted to bequests - is a general mech-
anism that does not hinge on logarithmic forms. As shown by Alonso-Carrera et al. (2007)
- who assume exogenous population growth - habits make the operativeness of bequests less
likely even with generic additive preferences. Building on this mechanism, the peculiar result
14 In the rst two periods, the e¤ects of habits appear to be relatively small in terms of consumption levels
because the growth process is at its early stages. Since habits modify the propensity to consume, the reallocation
e¤ect of habits reverberates in each period in which agents save, and the consequences for income levels become
evident when the cumulative e¤ecton the capital stock has become quantitatively relevant.
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of our model remains: given the possibility of modifying the fertility rate, agents are able
to reduce the total cost of bequests by decreasing the number of children. In this respect,
notice that our assumption of logarithmic preferences may increase, rather than limit, the
generality of our conclusions. The reason is that, in both the AK and the neoclassical model
presented above, the negative long-run impact of habits arises without making ad-hoc assump-
tions of complementarity, or substitutability, between consumption and fertility in individual
preferences.
5 Connections with previous literature
With respect to previous literature on demographic transition, the main distinctive feature of
our analysis is given by our main result: habit formation - and, in general, status-dependent
preferences - may constitute an important part of the explanations for the decline of fertility
rates exhibited by developed economies. To our knowledge, previous studies did not address
this issue. The old-age security approach postulates that present fertility choices are driven
by the expectation that children will provide support to their parents in the future, so that
variations in equilibrium fertility rates are determined by uncertainty over future incomes
(Nishimura and Zhang, 1995), and linked to the degree of risk aversion (Sah, 1991). In the
standard framework where children provide direct utility to their parents, and the fertility
decline may be due to increased productivity from technological progress (Galor and Weil,
2000), rising real wages that increase the opportunity cost of having children (Galor and Weil,
1996), and possible trade-o¤s between the quality and quantity of children (Becker 1991).
In this regard, we may stress that our results do not hinge on interactions between the op-
portunity cost of fertility and technological development. In the present analysis, the central
element is the psychological cost of having children: low fertility rates originate in the distorted
perception of joy from consumptionthat old agents have in the second period of life. Our
reasoning also di¤ers from explanations based on quality-quantity trade-o¤s. If parents reduce
the number of children in order to provide better education to each successor, the roots of low
fertility rates are to be found in parental altruism, whereas our analysis suggests the conclu-
sion - perhaps less pleasant, but worth considering - that the source of low fertility rates is
parental egotisminduced by habits. From a broader perspective, the present analysis seems
complementary to the related literature on Malthusian stagnation and demographic transi-
tion - e.g. Galor and Weil (2000), Boldrin and Jones (2002). These contributions explicitly
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model the rise and overlap of di¤erent phases of development, and characterize demographic
transitions by considering the interactions between fertility, factor availability and technology
improvements. As we have emphasized the interactions between fertility and preferences, ex-
tending the present analysis to include technological transitions seems an interesting topic for
future research.
The central role of bequests in our results suggests some similarities between our approach
and that followed by Blackburn and Cipriani (2005), who argue that population dynamics
are crucially governed by the direction of intergenerational transfers. Blackburn and Cipriani
(2005) assume two-sided altruism in a model that generates development paths consistent
with the Caldwell hypothesis (Caldwell, 1982): low development is associated with young-to-
old transfers and large family size, whereas high-development phases feature lower fertility
and old-to-young transfers. With respect to Blackburn and Cipriani (2005), our analysis is
di¤erent in both aims and means. At the formal level, the models di¤er in two important ways.
First, we rule out two-sided altruism, and focus on equilibrium paths with operative bequests
- that is, transfers are father-to-sonby construction. Second, habits are not considered in
Blackburn and Cipriani (2005), whereas they represent the central feature of our analysis. At
the conceptual level, our aim is di¤erent. Blackburn and Cipriani (2005) formalize the Caldwell
hypothesis, and reproduce the demographic transition along these lines by considering possible
switch-overs in the direction of transfers. In this paper, we asked whether persistently low
fertility rates can also be explained by time-dependent preferences, arguing that the stage of
development a¤ects population growth because agents internalize previous standards of living
into their bequest motives and fertility choices. Our reasoning is referred to the empirical
evidence on the intertemporal behavior of consumers, and is also consistent with less recent
historical facts. In the 18th century, the aristocracy pursued low-reproduction strategies in
order to avoid the partition of the family property and maintain family status (Johansson,
1987). In the 19th century, similar strategies were intentionally adopted by the bourgeoisie
and land-owners, gradually spreading across other social classes (Haines, 1992).
With respect to the literature on habit formation and economic growth, we can make four
remarks. The rst comment relates to the neoclassical model. In their seminal paper, Ryder
and Heal (1973) show that habits do not modify the long-run equilibrium of the economy, as the
Ramsey model with innite horizons predicts convergence towards the usual modied golden
rule. In Section 4, we have shown that habit formation modies the long-run growth rate of
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the economy instead. The reason for our result is not the assumption of nite lifetimes,15 but
rather that of endogenous fertility: habits matter because they a¤ect the equilibrium fertility
rate, and thereby the growth rate of aggregate output in any equilibrium with stationary
income per capita. This result can be seen in parallel with that of Alvarez-Cuadrado et
al. (2004), which asserts that habit formation becomes relevant for long-run growth when
production possibilities are improved by exogenous productivity growth in the Ramsey model.
The second remark is related to the AK framework. Carrol et al. (1997) studied the
role of habits in the standard AK model with exogenous fertility, showing that the degree of
habit formation a¤ects the long-run growth rate of the economy if the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution di¤ers from unity (ibid., eqs.(17)-(19): p.345). The logarithmic case thus
yields no growth e¤ects of habits in the representative-agent framework - and this is also the
case in our OLG model of Section 3, where the growth rate in aggregate variables, A, is
independent of the degree of habit formation, ". Specifying non-logarithmic preferences in our
AK model would re-introduce a missing link between habits and growth in aggregate variables.
However, the aim of Section 3 is to emphasize the peculiar role of endogenous fertility and habit
formation in determining fundamental changes in the growth rate of per capita variables. The
assumption of logarithmic preferences allows us to study the various cases - i.e. extinction,
overcrowding, and non-degenerate growth in Proposition 3 - in isolation from transitional
dynamics and elasticity-induced growth e¤ects à la Carrol et al. (1997).
The third remark is related to models with overlapping generations. A comparable frame-
work is that employed by Alonso-Carrera et al. (2007), who study a three-period OLG model
with habit formation and inherited tastes. As we pointed out in Section 4.2, one of the results
of Alonso-Carrera et al. (2007) can be identied with the rst logical step of our reasoning:
habits tend to contrast dynastic altruism. Di¤erently from Alonso-Carrera et al. (2007) - who
assume exogenous population growth - our model features endogenous fertility, which allows
us to show that habits contrast population growth because habit formation prompts agents
to reduce the cost of parental altruism in the second period of life.
The fourth remark refers to the links between habit formation and parental-based status.
In related work, de la Croix and Michel (1999) analyze status-dependent preferences in order
to study the e¤ects of inherited tastes, assuming that the satisfaction index of a newborn
15 If we drop the assumption of endogenous fertility, we obtain an OLG model with dynastic altruism which
yields identical predictions to the Ramsey model with nite horizons, provided that bequests are operative in
each period along the equilibrium path (see de la Croix and Michel, 2002: Chap.5).
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agent is higher the higher is the gap between his current consumption and the level of aspi-
rationdetermined by the consumption level of the parents. In the current model, this type of
preferences would take the form U (ct; et+1; nt; ct 1) = u (nt) + u (ct; ct 1) + v (et+1), which
clearly di¤ers from (5). Indeed, the phenomenon of inherited tastes is di¤erent from - and it
may be simultaneous to - that of habit formation, which refers to the comparison that each
agent makes between his own current and past consumption levels. It is possible to extend our
model to include inherited tastes, though it is di¢ cult to speculate on the consequences with-
out explicit modelling: while aspirations would make the existence of positive bequests easier
(Alonso-Carrera et al. 2007), the interaction between aspirations and endogenous fertility
choices is an open question that we leave for future research.
6 Conclusion
The recent growth literature proposes a number of explanations for (i) the low fertility rates
currently observed in developed economies, and (ii) the phenomenon known as demographic
transition. Theoretical contributions considered fertility choices under old-age security mo-
tives, or satisfaction-based approaches. In the standard framework, children provide direct
utility to their parents, and the demographic transition may be due to increased productivity
generated by technological progress, rising costs of child rearing, possible trade-o¤s between
the quality and quantity of children, and the reversal in the direction of intergenerational
transfers. In this paper, we have argued that economic development may a¤ect population
dynamics through a di¤erent channel, i.e. the interactions between fertility choices and habit
formation in consumption. Most theoretical models with endogenous fertility assume that con-
sumption choices are based on standard time-separable preferences, though a growing body
of empirical evidence suggests that preferences are status-dependent in reality. Building on
this point, we have studied fertility choices and habit formation in an overlapping generations
model, assuming that the opportunity cost of having children is determined by bequests. In
this setting, habits contrast dynastic altruism through status-e¤ects. Our reasoning may be
linked to the empirical observation that low-reproduction strategies have historically been in-
tentional choices aimed at preserving the family property and status (Johansson, 1987; Haines,
1992).
A rst general result is that habits reduce population growth. The reason is that, due to
habit formation, consumption choices are biased in favor of second-period consumption, and
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agents aim at reducing the loss in second-period utility induced by bequests. Being able to
choose the number of children, individuals reduce fertility in order to make parental altruism
less costly. We have studied this mechanism under two alternative technology specications.
In the neoclassical model, habits modify the economys growth rate and generate transitional
dynamics in fertility that are compatible with the phenomenon of demographic transition.
In the long run, stationary income per capita is associated with either increasing or decreas-
ing population and output, depending on the strength of habits. In the AK specication,
growing population and increasing consumption per capita require that the habit coe¢ cient
lie within denite boundaries; outside the critical interval, positive growth is associated with
either declining consumption due to overcrowding, or extinction paths with declining pop-
ulation. In both frameworks, habits are responsible for the fertility decline, suggesting that
status-dependent preferences may have played an important role in the demographic transition
observed in developed economies.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1 From (19), condition (17) can be written as
et+1=ct = A + " (1 + ) : (A1)
Plugging vet+1 = (et+1   "ct) 1 in (10) and using (A1) to substitute et+1 yields
ctt = A (A+ ")
 1 : (A2)
Combining (A2) with (11) we obtain
ct+1nt = ctA: (A3)
Since Ct+1=Ct = nt (ct+1=ct), the above expression implies a constant growth rate of aggregate
consumption of the young, A. Moreover, substituting (A3) in (A1), and using Nyt+1 = ntN
o
t ,
we obtain (23), which completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 2 Dene xt  Kt=Ct. Dividing both sides of (21) by Ct+1, and
using (22)-(23) to eliminate Et, we obtain
xt+1 =
1

xt   A ( + ) + " (1 + )
(A)2
; (A4)
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which displays a unique steady-state solution
xss =
A ( + ) + " (1 + )
(1  ) A2 : (A5)
For a given K0, the initial condition x0 is determined by the jump-variable C0. Since  < 1,
the steady-state is unstable, and all the trajectories starting from x0 6= xss are explosive and
non-optimal.16 Hence, variable x jumps at the steady-state level xss at time zero, and is
constant thereafter. From Lemma 1 and constraint (21), xt = xss at each t implies balanced
growth from time zero onwards in aggregate variables, with Kt, Yt, Ct, and Et all growing at
the constant rate A. Since Kt=Ct = xss, we have Yt=Ct = (AKt=Ct)
 1 = (Axss) 1, which
implies (24) after substituting (A5).
Derivation of (26) Substituting rt+1 = A and (17) in (6) yields
bt+1 =
A
nt

wt + bt   ct (A+ ") (1 + )
A

:
Dividing both sides by ct+1 and using (A3), we have
zt+1 =
1


wt
ct
+ zt   (A+ ") (1 + )
A

: (A6)
Since wt=ct = (1  ) (Yt=Ct), the rst term in brackets equals (1  )  1, implying equation
(26) in the text.
Proof of Proposition 3 From (16), plugging unt = n
 1
t in the rst order
condition (13) gives tbt+1 = An 1t . Substituting expressions (A1) and (A3) we obtain
bt+1
ct+1
=
 (A+ ")
A
nt : (A7)
Since bt+1 = zssct+1 in each period, expression (A7) implies (30). Since @zss=@" < 0, it follows
from (30) that @nss=@" < 0.
Proof of Proposition 4 Since the growth rate of aggregate output Yt+1=Yt = A is
independent of habit formation, the non-ambiguous sign of the derivative @nss=@" < 0 implies
that there generally exist a couple of critical levels "0 and "00, with "0 < "00, such that " = "0
16Explosive trajectories can ruled out following the standard argument. If x0 < xss, capital will become
negative in nite time, violating the aggregate constraint of the economy. If x0 > xss, capital grows faster than
consumption of the young, i.e. limt!1 (Kt+1=Kt) > A > , but this path would violate the transversality
condition limt!1 tKt  0.
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implies nss = A > 1, and " = "00 implies nss = 1. For reasonable parameter values, both "0
and "00 are strictly positive, implying cases (i), (ii) and (iii) - see Figure 1.
Derivation of (36)-(37) Equation (37) is obtained as follows. Substituting vet+1 =
(et+1   "ct) 1 in (10) we obtain nt = t+1 (et+1   "ct). Substituting t+1 = tntr 1t+1 from
(11) we thus have rt+1 = t (et+1   "ct). Substituting et+1 = ct [rt+1 + " (1 + )] from (17)
we obtain

ct [rt+1 + " (1 + )]  "ct =
t
rt+1
which reduces to (37) after rearranging terms and substituting rt+1 = f 0 (kt+1). Equation (36)
is obtained as follows. From (34) it follows that
ct +
et+1
rt+1
= ct +
ct [rt+1 + " (1 + )]
rt+1
= ct (1 + )

rt+1 + "
rt+1

(A8)
Substituting (A8) in (6) we obtain
bt+1 =
rt+1
nt
(wt + bt)  ct (1 + )

rt+1 + "
nt

: (A9)
Now rewrite condition (35) as
bt+1 =
unt
t
rt+1 and bt =
unt 1
t 1
rt; (A10)
and combine (A10) with (A9) to get
unt = t
1
nt

wt +
unt 1
t 1
rt

  tct (1 + ) 1
nt

rt+1 + "
rt+1

: (A11)
Substituting (37) in (A11) yields
untnt = twt + unt 1
t
t 1
rt   (1 + ) ; (A12)
and, substituting tt 1 rt =
nt 1
 , we obtain
untnt = unt 1nt 1
1

+ twt   (1 + ) :
Substituting wt = (1  ) f (kt) and untnt = nt we obtain expression (36).
Derivation of (44)-(45) Using (39) to substitute e in (38), and using (42) to sub-
stitute c in the resulting expression, we have
nk = f (k) 

1


f 0 (k)
f 0 (k) + "

n + f 0 (k) + " (1 + )
n

: (A13)
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Since f 0 (k) = Hk
 1
 , condition (40) implies f 0 (k) = n= and k =

H
n
 1
1 
. Substi-
tuting these results in (A13) we obtain
n

H
n
 1
1 
= H

H
n
 
1 
 

1


n=
n= + "

n + n= + " (1 + )
n

:
from which
 =
n + n (=) + " (1 + )
n + "
"
H

H
n
 
1 
  n

H
n
 1
1 
# 1
: (A14)
From (41) we have
n =


1  

1

[(1 + )  (1  ) f (k)] ;
where we can substitute (A14) and f (k) = H

H
n
 
1 
to obtain
n =
 (1 + )
 (1  )  
(1  )
 (1  ) (1  )

n ( + ) + " (1 + )
n + "

: (A15)
Dening ga (n) = n and gb (n) as the right hand side of (A15), this equilibrium condition
can be re-written as ga (n) = gb (n).
Proof of Proposition 5 Expression (45) implies
lim
"!0
gb (n) =
 (1 + )
 (1  )  
(1  ) ( + )
 (1  ) (1  ) ; (A16)
As " ! 0, gb (n) becomes independent of n, and reduces to a horizontal line in the gi   n
plane. Since 0 <  < 1, the function ga (n) = n is strictly increasing in the gi   n plane,
and satises ga (0) = 0. This implies that only one value n > 0 may satisfy the equilibrium
condition ga = gb (see Figure 2). Imposing (43) we obtain
n =

1
 (1  )

 (1 + )  (1  ) ( + )
(1  )
1=
: (A17)
The term in square brackets implies that there exists a unique well-dened equilibrium when
parameters satisfy
 (1 + )
 + 
>
1  
1   : (A18)
When (A18) is violated, there is no well-dened equilibrium, since the right hand side of (A16)
is negative. The unique equilibrium is feasible if and only if the right hand side of (A17) is
greater than .
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Proof of Proposition 6. Notice that, when " > 0, the existence of an equilibrium is
linked to the case of inactive habits: in order to have an equilibrium it is necessary that (A18)
is satised.17 As regards the characteristics of candidate equilibria, the reasoning is as follows.
As shown in the main text, both ga (n) and gb (n) are strictly increasing and concave in n
for any " > 0. The vertical intercepts are
ga (0) = lim
n!0
ga (n) = 0; (A19)
gb (0) = lim
n!0
gb (n) =
 (1 + )
 (1  )  
(1  ) (1 + )
 (1  ) (1  ) : (A20)
Expression (A20) implies that18
 > (1 + ) 1 =) gb (0) > ga (0) = 0, (A21)
 < (1 + ) 1 =) gb (0) < ga (0) = 0: (A22)
Case (A21) is characterized by the fact that the vertical intercept of gb is higher than ga (0) = 0.
Case (A22) is characterized by the fact that the vertical intercept of gb is lower than ga (0) = 0.
The issue of the number of intersections can be addressed by comparing the curvature of the
two functions as captured by the Arrow-Pratt coe¢ cients (APa and APb), respectively equal
to
APa =  g
a (n)00 n
ga (n)0
= 1  ; (A23)
APb =  g
b (n)00 n
gb (n)0
=
2n
n + "
: (A24)
While APa is constant, positive, and smaller than unity, expression (A24) implies
@APb
@n
=
2"
(n + ")2
> 0; (A25)
lim
n!0
APb = 0 < APa; (A26)
lim
n!1
APb = 2 > APa; (A27)
Expressions (A25)-(A27) imply that the curvature of gb (n) falls short of that of ga (n) in
the origin, and then monotonically increases, eventually exceeding that of ga (n) for higher
values of n. This implies the following results:
17As shown in expression (47), when " > 0, the curve gb (n) is bounded above by lim"!0 gb (n). In order
to have an intersection ga = gb it is thus necessary to have lim"!0 gb (n) > 0, which in turn requires satisfying
(A18).
18Setting gb (0) > 0 and substituting the last term in (A20) we obtain  > 1 
1  , which can be re-written as

 
1  2 > 1   . Substituting 1   2 = (1  ) (1 + ) and rearranging terms we obtain expression (A21),
and therefore expression (A22).
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(a) Suppose that  > (1 + ) 1. From (A21) we have gb (0) > ga (0). Given this, expressions
(A25)-(A27) imply that the condition ga = gb can be satised only by a unique intersec-
tion where gb (n) cuts ga (n) from above, as shown in Figure 2 (a). This intersection
characterizes a feasible equilibrium provided that parameters imply n > .
(b) Suppose that  < (1 + ) 1. From (A21) we have gb (0) < ga (0), and expressions (A25)-
(A27) imply that the condition ga = gb can be satised by two intersections, n0 > 0
and n00 > 0, with n0 < n00. As shown in Figure 2 (b), the highintersection n00 has the
same properties as the unique equilibrium arising in Diagram (a): ga = gb is satised
with gb (n) cutting ga (n) from above; the lowintersection n0, instead, satises the
condition ga = gb with gb (n) cutting ga (n) from below.
Given cases (a) and (b), if we can rule out n0 as unfeasible, we obtain the proof that the
steady-state equilibrium of the economy is unique, and is characterized by an intersection in
which gb (n) cuts ga (n) from above. The proof is as follows. Suppose that parameters are
such that ga = gb is satised with n = . From (A24), this intersection would be characterized
by
n =  =) APb = 2
1 + "
: (A28)
From (A23) and (A28), it follows that, for any " < 1, we have APb > APa.19 That is, an
intersection ga = gb with n =  can only be satised with gb (n) cutting ga (n) from above.
This reasoning can be repeated for any intersection in which n > : since APb is increasing in
n while APa is xed, any intersection ga = gb with n >  is characterized by gb (n) cutting
ga (n) from above. It follows from this result that the candidate equilibrium n0 which arises
in case (b) with gb (n) cutting ga (n) from below is necessarily characterized by n0 < , and
this is not a feasible equilibrium. The conclusion is that, irrespective of whether we are in
case (a) or in case (b), there may exist only one feasible steady state with n > , and this
equilibrium is represented by an intersection in which gb (n) cuts ga (n) from above.
Proof of Lemma 7. If nmax > 1, there exists a critical value of habit formation " > 0
for which we obtain an equilibrium n = . Being gb (n; ") strictly declining in ", well-dened
equilibria are characterized by values of " lying in the interval 0  " < ". Since  < 1, the
19Notice that " < 1 is a su¢ cient condition although it is not strictly necessary for the above argument. In
general, APb > APa is obtained whenever " < 1+1  . We emphasize the condition " < 1 as this is a reasonable
assumption.
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equilibrium n = 1 is feasible, i.e. it lies in the interior of the relevant region - see Figure
2. Since @gb=@" < 0, the equilibrium n = 1 is associated with a critical value of the habit
coe¢ cient " such that 0 < " < ". As a consequence, there exists a subset of well-dened
equilibria associated with growing population (characterized by 0 < " < " and n > 1), and
another subset associated with declining population (characterized by " < " < " and n < 1).
Proof of Proposition 8. From Lemma 7, if " falls in the intervals mentioned in cases
(i), (ii) and (iii), we respectively have increasing, decreasing, and constant population. The
proof is completed by recalling that Yt+1=Yt = n holds in the steady-state by virtue of (49).
Derivation of (50)-(52) Equations (51)-(52) directly follow from (35)-(36). Equa-
tion (50) can be obtained as follows. Re-writing (52) at time t and substituting t =
rt+1 [ct (rt+1 + ")]
 1 from (37) we get
t 1ct =
rt+1rt
nt 1 (rt+1 + ")
: (A29)
Substituting t 1 = rt [ct 1 (rt + ")] 1 from (37) and et = ct 1 [rt + " (1 + )] from (17) we
have
et
nt 1
= ct
(rt+1 + ") [rt + " (1 + )]
rt+1 (rt + ")
: (A30)
Plugging (A30) in (33), and substituting (37) to eliminate ct we obtain
ntkt+1 = f (kt)  f
0 (kt+1)
t (f 0 (kt+1) + ")

1 +
(f 0 (kt+1) + ") [f 0 (kt) + " (1 + )]
f 0 (kt+1) (f 0 (kt) + ")

; (A31)
which implies (50) in the text.
Simulation method. Backward iteration requires to determine an initial value to
evaluate the time-reversed system up to a termination criterion, and to revert the obtained
sequence of solutions. Since the analytical selection of an initial value on the stable manifold
is generally not available, the initial value is given by a point in the neighborhood of the
steady state. A good approximation is obtained by making use of the stable eigenvector of
the Jacobian J which is tangent to the saddle path at the stationary solution (k; ; n). We
thus set
k0
0
n0
=
k

n
+ didd;
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where di represents the initial deviation from the equilibrium and dd denes the direction. The
initial values (k0; 0; n0) are set equal to (kt+1; t+1; nt+1) and the system (50)-(52) is solved
backward for (kt; t; nt), and so on. In the simulation, the approximations of the linearized
system proved to be a good rst guess for the solution of the system. The linearized system is

kt
t
nt
 = P

A1 
t
1
A2 
t
2
A3 
t
3
+

k

n
 ;
where P contains the eigenvectors p1; p2; p3, and A1; A2; A3 represent arbitrary constants.
Since 1; 2 > 1, it follows immediately that A1 = A2 = 0, such that
kt = p3;1A3
t
3 + k
t = p3;2A3
t
3 + 
nt = p3;3A3
t
3 + n:
Since k0 is given, A3 is obtained as k0 ke3;1 = A3.
Proof of Proposition 9. Multiplying both terms of (50) by t+1 and substituting
(51) we obtain
t+1kt+1f
0(kt+1) = tf(kt)  f
0(kt+1)
f 0(kt+1) + "
  f
0(kt+1) + "(1 + )
(f 0(kt+1) + ")
: (A32)
Since f 0(kt+1) = rt+1 and kt+1f 0(kt+1) = f(kt+1), we can dene the shadow value of output
per capita as Qt  tyt = tf (kt) and rewrite (A32) as
Qt+1 =
1


Qt   rt+1
rt+1 + "
  rt+1 + "(1 + )
(rt+1 + ")

: (A33)
If " = 0, this expression reduces to
Qt+1 =
1


Qt    + 


; (A34)
which displays a unique steady-state Qss =
+
(1 ) . Since  < 1, this steady-state is unstable,
and explosive paths can be ruled out as suboptimal: if limt!1Qt =  1 capital per worker
must become negative in nite time, whereas limt!1Qt = +1 would violate the transversality
condition limt!1 tkt = 0. Hence, when habits are inactive, the shadow value of output per
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capita jumps at Qss at time zero, and stays there forever (this result is intuitive, since (37)
implies that, when " = 0, the shadow value of rst-period consumption is constant and equal
to unity at each point in time). The fact that Qt = Qss in each t implies that fertility rates
exhibit no transition. To see this, rewrite (36) as
nt+1 =
1

nt +
1

[(1  )Qt+1   (1 + )] : (A35)
If " = 0 we have Qt+1 = Qss, and (A35) displays an unstable steady-state in fertility rates.
Ruling out explosive paths that would make nt diverge to plus/minus innity, the only possible
equilibrium with inactive habits is characterized by Qt = Qss and nt = nmax at each point in
time, which completes the proof.
Derivation of (53). From (35) and (37)
ct+1
ct
=
 (rt+1 + ") rt+2
nt (rt+2 + ")
:
Using (34) to substitute ct, and rearranging terms, we have
ct+1
et+1
=
 (rt+1 + ") rt+2
nt (rt+2 + ") [rt+1 + " (1 + )]
:
Multiplying both sides by Nyt+1=N
o
t+1, and recalling that N
o
t+1 = N
y
t , we have
Ct+1
Et+1
=
 (rt+1 + ") rt+2
(rt+2 + ") [rt+1 + " (1 + )]
which implies (53) in the text.
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Figure 1. Dynamics of population and individual consumption (rst period) for di¤erent
values of ". Parameter values are  = 0:75,  =  =  = 0:5, and  = 0:6. Non-degenerate
growth arises in all paths falling in the grey-shaded areas delimited by the critical values "0
and "00.
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Figure 2. Long-run equilibria in the neoclassical model for di¤erent values of ". Diagram (a):
unique intersections ga = gb and feasible equilibria. Diagram (b): multiple intersections
ga = gb and unique feasible equilibria.
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Figure 3. Transitional dynamics of capital per capita kt, rst-period consumption ct, and
bequest-consumption ratio zt = bt=ct.
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Figure 4. Transitional dynamics of fertility rates for increasing strength of habits.
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